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Books in a law library. RDM carefully studies contract language and contract law to ensure our clients know what they're signing.

The Eastern District of Missouri recently highlighted the importance of plain language, or the ordinary meaning doctrine, which suggests words in contracts should be given their everyday meaning unless the context of the contract indicates an alternative.

Pelopidas v. Keller

Pelopidas v. Keller involved a dispute between a previously married couple and their respective interest in a company. After divorcing, the couple agreed to retain their respective 50% ownership of the Pelopidas holding company. One spouse remained the owner/manager of the company and the other was an owner/employee drawing salary and benefits.

The owner/employee brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty in 2016. Ultimately, the owner/manager ex-spouse resigned from the company in 2019 and the company’s largest client and primary source of revenue terminated its business relationship with Pelopidas. Following these events, the parties mediated the lawsuit and entered into a written agreement titled “Memorandum of Settlement” outlining an agreed transfer of interest from the owner/employee to the owner/manager in exchange for a monetary payment.

The contract language included “Plaintiff’s stock shall be surrendered/sold, escrowed and pledged back to Plaintiff” and included a payment schedule over three and a half years. There was no effective date for the transfer of the owner/employee’s interest. In early 2020, the parties reached an impasse regarding finalizing the settlement and transfer of stock. The owner/employee then filed suit to enforce her version of the transfer of stock settlement which included a different effective date than that proposed by the owner/manager. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the owner/manager on the grounds that the effective date of the transfer of stock was the date in which the settlement was executed. The owner/employee appealed.

The Eastern District reversed the trial court’s ruling, instead directing the court to enter summary judgment in favor of the owner/employee. The Eastern District stated, “It is well established that the cardinal principle for contract interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intent.  To that end we use the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the contract’s words and consider the document as a whole.”

What’s The Difference Between Language of Performance and Language of Obligation?

The appeals court went on to determine the plain meaning of the use of “shall be” in relation to the transfer of the stock to determine the intent for whether it imposed a future obligation or immediate performance. The Court stated, “very simply, it is the only reasonable interpretation of the words “shall be” in [the contract clause], which clearly commands that each of these requirements occur sometime after [the date the settlement was executed].”

The Court went on to cite to the American Bar Association’s A Manual of Style for Contract Drafting which notes the differences between language of performance and language of obligation.

Language of Performance: Expresses actions accomplished by means of signing the contract itself, is typically accomplished by use of the word “hereby.”

Language of Obligation: States any duty a contract imposes on one or more parties and is typically accomplished by use of the word “shall” or “will.”

The Court noted that this plain language interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit was accomplished with the same language “shall be” with the intent that the lawsuit be dismissed at a future date following the execution of the supplemental documentation related to stock transfer.

“Hereby” vs. “Shall Be”

The takeaway lesson for businesses and contract drafters is to avoid utilizing any language of obligation if the intent of the parties is to effectuate the date of the agreement at the time of execution. In fact, the ABA manual specifically states in Section 3.72, that the word “shall” should not be used to express anything other than language of obligation in a contract. The alternative language to effectuate the date of the stock transfer as the date of the settlement execution could have been, “Plaintiff’s stock is hereby surrendered/sold, escrowed and shall be pledged back to Plaintiff.”

When drafting a contract, the details are of utmost importance. RDM’s Business Law Team understands the ins and outs of complex contractual agreements and can help you ensure that what you see is what you get. Contact RDM before you sign on the dotted line.

The futsal court in Marquette Park.

Rasmussen Dickey Moore member attorney Nate Lindsey recently participated in the kickoff event for the first outdoor futsal court in St. Louis. As part of his work with Dutchtown Main Streets, a volunteer-run community development non-profit, Nate teamed up with the organization’s subcommittee Allies of Marquette Park to usher in a new era of soccer to Marquette. Nate organized and collaborated with St. Louis CITY SC, the St. Louis Parks Department, and a host of private donors, community organizations, and contractors to have the futsal court installed at Marquette Park.

Continue reading RDM Attorney Nate Lindsey Helps Bring Futsal to Dutchtown
RDM associate attorney discusses the process for filing a motion for summary judgment in Missouri.

As a first-year associate, the responsibility of drafting your first motion for summary judgment is daunting. Law students are introduced to the basics of the summary judgment standard in their 1L Civil Procedure class, and—depending on what route you took through law school—reacquainted with the standard when preparing for the bar exam.

After three years of school and a summer of studying, any law school graduate can likely rattle off the summary judgment standard without missing a beat. But what I’ve come to learn in actual practice is that understanding the dos and don’ts of drafting the motion is a skill that is learned through careful guidance from senior attorneys, a little bit of patience, and some trial and error. There are key aspects to the motion that first year associates should learn to start looking for, such as knowing the right time to file and the facts you will rely on as the basis for the motion.

Where it all begins though, is understanding the required framework for drafting this motion. In Missouri, knowing the applicable law is critical to learning this framework. And in my short time since I began practicing law, I’ve already seen opposing counsels make the fatal mistake of failing to subscribe to it.

Continue reading Drafting a Summary Judgment Motion in Missouri
A person receiving a COVID-19 vaccination. RDM's Brandon Powell discusses employer mandated vaccinations.

In a previous post on the RDM Knowledge Blog, we wrote about the legal authority of both federal and state governments to mandate vaccinations among its citizens. In the article, we surmised that although states would have the authority to require vaccines, the political climate rendered such a position unlikely. This has been largely borne out, as no state has made vaccinations compulsory among non-employees, even more than six months after the widespread availability of multiple vaccines and despite lagging vaccination numbers in many states.

Instead, recent mandatory vaccine headlines have been driven by private employers. Earlier this month, the news network CNN fired three employees for coming to work unvaccinated, while Houston-based Methodist Hospital lost 150 employees after it initiated a policy that required all employees to receive the vaccine. Various other corporations, including Facebook, Ford, and Goldman Sachs, have also instituted mandatory COVID vaccine policies for its employees.

As the actions of these major corporations suggest, mandatory vaccination policies are, generally speaking, valid and enforceable. Nevertheless, enforcement of these policies is not without complication. Employers may have to provide “reasonable accommodation” to persons unwilling or unable to be vaccinated for religious reasons or due to disability or pregnancy. Furthermore, the passage of state bills prohibiting mandatory vaccination programs make matters even more complicated.

Federal Employment Law and COVID Vaccination Mandates

Most employment in the United States is “at will,” meaning that the employee-employer relationship exists at the “will” of the parties, lasting only so long as both parties wish to continue it.  An employee can resign from his or her job for any reason. Likewise, an employer can dismiss an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason as all, as long as the reason is not prohibited by law. 

Furthermore, employers have a duty, under both federal and state law, to maintain a reasonably safe work environment for their employees (think OSHA).

Based upon these general principles, employers have the duty to create a safe workplace for their employees, which may generally include compulsory vaccinations. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agrees, concluding that “federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19.”

However, as with many aspects of federal employment law, there are notable caveats to this general rule of which employers must be aware. While an employer may initiate a generally applicable rule for mandatory COVID-19 vaccines, per the EEOC, they will be subject to “reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations.”

Stated plainly, this means that if an employee is unable to comply with the employer’s vaccination policy due to sincerely held religious belief, disability, pregnancy, or another protected issue, an employer must provide the employee a reasonable accommodation unless it can show that doing so would provide an “undue hardship” on the employer. Examples of accommodations that the EEOC recognizes include face masks, having the employee work in a socially distanced workspace away from other employees, modified work shifts, periodic COVID testing, or giving the employee the opportunity to telework.

The full nature and extent of these accommodations have not been litigated in the courts yet, at least not within the context of the COVID pandemic. But employers should, at minimum, engage in the interactive process upon learning of an employee’s desire for accommodation. 

State Laws and COVID Vaccine Requirements

Analysis of these issues under state law generally begin with the same general principles. “At will” employment is recognized in every state other than Montana. As such, employers can terminate employees on any non-prohibited basis, including violation of generally applicable workplace safety policies. See Farris v. Dep’t of Empl. Sec., 2014 IL (4th) 130391 (affirming the termination of an employee for violation of biosecurity safety policy under Illinois law).

However, given the political nature of the COVID pandemic, state legislatures around the county have complicated this issue by introducing, and in some cases enacting, bills prohibiting employers from requiring vaccinations. As of August 17th, 2021, at least five states have laws that limit (or will limit upon the effective date) an employer’s ability to take adverse action against an unvaccinated employee. Those states are Arizona, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio. Each bill differs in their details, ranging from Arizona’s requirement that employers must reasonably accommodate religious objections to the vaccine to Montana’s prohibition against requiring employees receive the vaccine as a condition of employment.

Additionally, a majority of states have bills pending which could impact an employer’s right in this regard, though eventual passage of these bills depends on their individual circumstances. In Illinois, the COVID-19 Workplace Vaccination Program Limitation Act would prohibit an employer from creating a mandatory vaccination program, though this bill has been stuck in committee since May of 2021, and is ultimately unlikely to pass.

In Missouri, on the other hand, multiple bills have already been introduced in the legislature (see House Bill 566 and Senate Resolution 203), and given that Missouri Governor Mike Parson has already signed a law to prohibit vaccine passports—preventing governmental entities from requiring citizens to be vaccinated—it is likely that employment bills could receive more traction in this state.

Can You Require a COVID Vaccination as an Employer?

Before enacting any workplace policies on vaccination, employers should check the status of statewide bills to determine whether the vaccination requirements would be permissible or enforceable in the state. Rasmussen Dickey Moore’s Employment and Labor Law Team advises employers on complying with federal, state, and local laws. As the legislative landscape rapidly changes through the pandemic, trust RDM to help you keep your employees safe and keep your business safe from legal action. Contact RDM today to discuss your needs.

The Missouri Supreme Court recently issued an opinion on non-economic damages caps.

The Missouri Supreme Court has issued an opinion that could greatly impact the trajectory of tort law in the state. On July 22nd, 2021, the Court upheld Missouri’s non-economic damages cap for medical negligence claims and further held that it does not violate the Missouri Constitution’s right to trial by jury for the legislature to abolish personal injury causes of action existing in common law and replace by statute the same type of claim with new standards.

In 2015, the Missouri Legislature imposed statutory caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases. Prior to the legislation there were no caps, as such claims were common law actions, and juries had full discretion to award damages.

Last week, in Maria del Carmen Ordinola Velasquez vs. University Physician Associates et al., the Missouri Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutionality of those caps after the Western District Court of Appeals referred the case. The Court affirmed a judgment capping non-economic damages in a medical practice case where the trial court found the plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries.

The Court held that the legislature does indeed have the power to abolish common law causes of action and supersede them with statutory actions. Judge George W. Draper III dissented, expressing concern for the legislature’s ability to overturn common law causes of action. Draper called the statutory changes “an act of form over substance” that “fails to protect the constitutional right to trial by jury.” Nonetheless, the Missouri Legislature now appears to have increased freedom to institute tort reform in other areas of the law. The Court also reiterated that the cap on non-economic damages should be calculated at the time of trial in comparison to the time of injury. Missouri has set an increasing cap through 2050 for injuries considered non-catastrophic and a higher cap for those considered catastrophic.

While caps on medical damages have been in place for several years in Missouri, the broader impact of this ruling is the affirmation of the Missouri General Assembly’s authority to reform negligence law in the state, raising the possibility of further tort reform in the future.

It is important that medical professionals and healthcare providers have the right attorneys on their side to further mitigate risk and potential damages. Even with non-economic damages caps firmly in place, medical malpractice litigation can still be costly and time consuming.

RDM’s Professional Liability and Healthcare Law teams have extensive experience representing professionals and institutions in medical malpractice cases. From developing risk management strategies to crafting a trial defense, Rasmussen Dickey Moore has what it takes to protect you in court. Contact us today to learn how we can help you with medical malpractice litigation.